I’m no philosopher or even a grad student in philosophy. But I find that philosophy of religion is about the most interesting subject that I can read about.
I stumbled across a blog entry by John Depoe that questions the validity of Alvin Plantinga’s religious epistemology and the notion of the proper basicality of beliefs. In his critique, Depoe quotes from Norman Geisler’s Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics. I looked up the referred article and found a few points to make. (Remember, I have no training in philosophy, so please be patient and forgiving.)
Geisler writes that including the belief in God as a properly basic one would “undercut natural theology, the need to provide any arguments for God’s existence.” This is obviously not a concern of Plantinga’s as evidenced by his “Two Dozen (or so) Theistic Arguments”. Just because one doesn’t need evidence to believe in God, that doesn’t mean there isn’t any evidence. Some examples that Plantinga provides are: The argument from intentionality, the argument from natural numbers, the argument from positive epistemic status, versions of the teleological argument. He lists his arguments under the following categories: metaphysical arguments, epistemological arguments, moral arguments, and other (e.g. the argument from colors and flavors).
Geisler continues with “[Plantinga’s] view is a kind of fideistic foundationalism” and later writes “Like other fideists…”. It’s clear that Geisler thinks Plantinga is a fideist. In the Encyclopedia article titled “Fideism”, Geisler writes, “Religious fideism agues matters of faith and religious belief are not supported by reason. Reason is a matter of faith and cannot be argued by reason. One must simply believe.” If this is what fideism is, then Plantinga is no fideist. In his book Reasonable Faith, William Lane Craig writes, “Plantinga thus insists that his epistemology is not fideistic; the deliverances of reason include not only inferred propositions, but also properly basic propositions. God has so constructed us that we naturally form the belief in his existence under appropriate circumstances, just as we do the belief in perceptual objects, the reality of the past, and so forth. Hence, belief in God is among the deliverances of reason, not faith.” (p. 29) The following articles, “Theism, Atheism, and Rationality”, “Intellectual Sophistication and belief in God”, and “Theism as a Properly Basic Belief” show Plantinga using reason to stake out his position. For book lovers, see his Warranted Christian Belief and Faith and Rationality.
Geisler writes, “The denial that there are any self-evident foundational principles of thought involves one either in an infinite regress, where no justification is ever given, or else in an arbitrary cut-off point where one simply stops giving a justification.” Plantinga doesn’t deny that there are self-evident foundational principles. He gladly includes self-evident and incorrigible beliefs as basic ones in a person’s noetic structure. He simply thinks that these are not the only beliefs that are properly basic. Common examples of these other basic beliefs would be memory beliefs, the belief in the existence of an external universe, the belief that the people around you have minds and are not really automatons. When you see a tree, you don’t base your belief that you see the tree on any other beliefs. The belief that you’re seeing a tree is present immediately to your mind. Now, saying that a belief is basic doesn’t necessarily mean that it is true. It simply means that you don’t require any more basic or foundational beliefs to support that particular belief.
Geisler writes that unless the reformed epistemologist provides a rational justification for his basic belief, he “simply begs the question.” First of all, basic beliefs are precisely those beliefs that don’t require any further rational justification. Second, if the lack of rational justification for a basic belief begs the question, then anyone who holds, for example, that the universe has existed for more than five minutes also begs the question, since the holder of this particular belief would be pretty hard pressed to provide a rational justification for that belief. Both the belief in God and the belief that the universe has existed for more than five minutes are in the same epistemological boat.
Geisler writes, “Plantinga here failed to distinguish between belief in and belief that God exists.” In his book God, Freedom and Evil, Plantinga writes, “Now belief in God is not the same thing as belief that God exists, or that there is such a thing as God. To believe that God exists is simply to accept a proposition of a certain sort – a proposition affirming that there is a personal being who, let’s say, has existed from eternity, is almighty, is perfectly wise…To believe in God, however, is quite another matter… Belief in God means trusting God…” (p.1-2). Surely a philosopher and thinker as sophisticated as Plantinga would know the difference between belief in and belief that.
Calvin College philosophy professorKelly James Clark, in an article that I can’t locate any more, says that the way people normally come to religious faith is not through arguments (though I’m sure some do, but the majority of people don’t) but through experiences of various kinds under the right circumstances. The locus of faith is not rational argumentation but rather the work of the Holy Spirit.
So, I think that Geisler misrepresents Plantinga’s position. In addition, Geisler himself at one point in his Christian walk held to belief in God without rational justification. In a radio interview that I heard three or four years ago, Geisler said that he became interested in philosophy and apologetics when, after becoming a Christian as a teenager, people would challenge him to prove God exists or to prove that Christ rose from the dead. As a new believer, Geisler couldn’t answer those challenges. So, since he lacked any rational justification for his belief in Jesus, was Geisler irrational in believing in Him? Shouldn’t he have dropped his belief in Christ since he couldn’t provide a justifying argument? Obviously not. His belief that Christianity was true was the very thing that spurred him on to become a leading Christian apologist. Isn’t it more likely the case that his belief in Christianity was properly basic?
I’ve got a few complaints about the rest of the Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics (though I, generally, find it to be a useful and helpful book). I’ll leave that for another time.
(I obviously have no idea what I'm talking about. Let's never bring the topic up again lest I make a bigger fool of myself.)
5 comments:
Hey Denis! I really enjoyed your blog. And I mean that sincerely! I took a Philosophy of Religion class in Ottawa and it sparked my interest. I've read a little bit of Plantinga, but I've always been interested in learning more. Reading your journal has kind of renewed my interest.
hi there, perhaps more interesting and pressing than the concerns Geisler raises is whether Plantinga's religious epistemology can secure what many Xians take to be a mainstay of their faith--the exclusivity of the Xian religion. While Plantinga's model doesn't commit him to denying that Xianity is the only *true* religion, it's not clear that he has the resources to deny that Hindus, Muslims, or believers in the Great Pumpkin are rationally justififed in holding their core beliefs on the basis of no inferential evidence; that is, given Plantinga's model, it's not clear why their beliefs can't be properly basic for them too. I think Plantinga actually admits this somewhere, at least in the case of the major world religions. Anyways, the upshot would be that Hindus, Muslims, etc. are no more nor no less rational than Xians in taking their core faith beliefs to be true. I personally have no problem w/ this. But I suspect many traditional--esp. evangelical--Xians would cringe at the thought (if not see it as a call to arms). Peace. luke
Luke, your comment is officially more interesting than my post. I suppose that the exclusivity of Xianity would have to rely more on the weight of evidence, in particular historical evidence than on just purely philosophical concerns?
this is a big ugly can of worms, mostly b/c it involves the relationship between rationality or reasonableness and truth. the debate over whether Xian beliefs can be properly basic is a debate about whether, or more precisely (in the context of Geisler v. Plantinga), the way in which, they're rational. Geisler says rationality requires evidence (in the case of Xian beliefs); Plantinga not. But I think both would agree that beliefs can be wholly rational or reasonable and stil turn out false. (It might be reasonable for me to hold the belief that the thing over there is a sheep even if in reality the thing over there is a life-like cardboard cutout of a sheep.) So Plantinga can say that Muslims, e.g., are rational in their beliefs, but that their beliefs are nonetheless false; and, moreover, that Xianity is the only true religion. But on a practical level, it's a really difficult question (for Plantinga) what the Xian can say to the Muslim to get her to come around to the Xian way of seeing things. You might be right: maybe the Plantinga-style Xian can say something like: "Okay my Muslim friend, I grant that you are perfectly rational in your Muslim beliefs. But here, take a look at these two dozen or so Christian arguments from testimonial and historical considerations. Doesn't this make Xianity more attractive, more likely to be true, than Islam, even if Islamic belefs themselves meet the rationality requirement?" Anyways, there's a real interesting series of articles by a fellow by the name of Stephen Wykstra--another prof of mine at Calvin--who defends a 'sensible evidentialism.' His basic claim is that evidence must in fact be available to someone in the Xian community for Xian beliefs to be rational. Not all individuals need to be acquainted w/ that evidence; but it does need to be out there, and someone in the community needs to be aware of it, and be able to pass it along to other members of the community, for the members of the community to be rational. I can get you the article info, where to find it and all, if you're intersted. Thanks for all the interesting posts! luke
Luke, thanks for your comment. By all means send me the info. I've seen Wykstra footnoted in a couple books I've read. Even if I can't understand it all, it's nice being able to read all this interesting stuff. Thanks again.
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